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LENDERS' LIABILITY-THE SHIFT FROM
CONTRACT TO TORT DOCTRINE DETERS
BANKS FROM ENFORCING UNJUSTIFIED AND
DETRIMENTAL CONTRACT PROVISIONS
INTRODUCTION

A businessman enters into a contract with a bank to borrow
money to build a new warehouse. He signs a loan agreement specifying that no one can lease part of the building without the bank's
approval. Upon discovering that he has excess capacity in the warehouse, the debtor leases part of the building without the bank's permission. Although the payments and insurance on the building are
current, the bank determines that the lessee has breached the contract and accelerates' the loan according to the contract provisions.
The debt forces the borrower, who is unable to find new financing or
payoff the loan, to declare bankruptcy. If the borrower sues the
bank for the damage caused to his business, will he prevail?
Courts addressing similar situations have reached conflicting results based upon the degree of importance that the courts have accorded the written document.' Where the court looked exclusively at
the written document to determine the respective rights of the parties, the creditor prevailed.s Where the court also examined the
manner in which the creditor exercised its prospective contractual
rights, 4 it has awarded judgments to debtors.5
The theory of "lender's liability" has attracted multimedia attention due to a $3.6. billion lawsuit that the Hunt brothers of Dallas
filed against twenty-three of the nation's largest banks.' The phe1. An acceleration clause in a credit agreement allows the creditor to call the
entire debt due when a default occurs, such as nonpayment of principle or interest.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 12 (5th ed. 1979) [hereinafter BLACK'S]; see also
Vaughan v. Crown Plumbing and Sewer Serv., Inc., 523 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (citing reasons for acceleration as a protection provision).
2. See infra notes 31-80 and accompanying text for discussions of contrasting
results based upon interpretation of written document.
3. Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distribs., Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
4. In a debtor-creditor contract, prospective contractual rights allow the creditor to take remedial action if the debtor defaults. Note, Debtor-Creditor:Estoppel of
Creditor Claims for Default for Non-Payment-"Stopping the Bleeding" or "Pulling
the Rug Out'?, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 82, 83 n.8 (1983). The usual prospective rights are
acceleration, foreclosure, forfeiture or repossession. Id.
5. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
6. The Hunt brothers' suit charges the banks with deliberately delaying the re-
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nomenon of debtors suing their bankers has resulted in several multimillion dollar damage awards.7 The real significance of the debtors'
victories, however, lies in the recognition of some courts that they
must hold the banking industry to high standards of good faith
conduct.8
Although banks have contracts allowing them to enforce draconian contract provisions against their debtors, enforcement of such
provisions without legitimate business reasons is tortious.9 To support this contention, this comment discusses why contract law fails
to provide debtors with adequate remedies against the egregious
conduct of creditors. Next, it focuses on society's perception of
banks as places of safety and probity.'0 This comment suggests that
although banks are profit-driven organizations, they cannot ignore
the reliance that customers place on their integrity and financial advice. Based on this reliance, banks are quasi-fiduciaries" which
courts must hold to high standards of fair dealing. Finally, this comment suggests a proposal that courts can implement to determine
whether a bank has committed a tort against its debtor.
CONTRACT LAW DOES NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS DEBTOR-CREDITOR
PROBLEMS

A debtor-creditor agreement is a contract whereby one party
advances money in return for the other party's promise to repay according to specified terms."2 Courts, therefore, have traditionally applied the principles of contract law to resolve debtor-creditor conflicts."8 As long as the parties to an agreement have equal
structuring of loans "to orchestrate a financial crisis," thus inducing the Hunt brothers to offer their personal assets to avoid bankruptcy. NAT'L L.J., Sept. 1, 1986 at 23,
col. 2.
7. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d 752 ($7.5 million award for breach of implied
covenant of good faith); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) ($18.6 million award for fraud, economic duress and business

interference).
8. First Nat'l Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
9. Legitimate business reasons as used in this comment refers to a creditor's
reasonable fear of default on the payment of the loan or the impairment of the security for the loan. See U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978) (providing that party may accelerate payment only if he in good faith believes prospect of payment is impaired).
10. See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of society's
perception.
11. A fiduciary is a person or institution having a duty to act primarily for another's benefit. BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 563. Debtor-creditor agreements may give
rise to fiduciary relationships where there ordinarily is no such obligation. See infra
note 158 for an example of a court finding that a debtor-creditor contract imposed a
fiduciary obligation on bank.
12. Symons, The Bank Customer Relation: Part 1-The Relevance of Contract
Doctrine, 100 BANKING L.J. 220, 232-33 (1983).
13. See, e.g., Iron Mountain Sec. Storage Corp. v. American Specialty Foods,
Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (tort recovery for breach of good faith and fair
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knowledge, ability, and power to influence the contract, the principles of contract law offer sufficient protection.1 4 If the parties do not
have equal bargaining power, however, and one party is able to exert
influence and obtain one-sided contract provisions,1" traditional contract remedies are inadequate to protect the weaker party in the
event of breach. This is particularly true when the stronger party is
an institution, such as a bank, in which people traditionally place
trust and confidence. 6 The failure of contract law to adequately address unequal bargaining power in debtor-creditor relationships lies
principally in two areas: interpretation and remedies.
Many courts are reluctant to look outside the four corners of a
written contract to interpret its meaning." Considering the adhesive
nature of loan agreements, courts must overcome this reluctance in
the case of debtor-creditor contracts.'" Loan agreements often contain insecurity clauses 9 allowing creditors to make aggressive and
dealing not recognized in debtor-creditor contract); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth Gen., 386 So. 2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (absent some other contractual arrangement, bank within rights in terminating financing); Rigby Corp. v. Boatman's Bank and Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to find tort
cause of action for breach of good faith because U.C.C. does not provide such a
remedy).
14. This is the classic exchange transaction between parties of relatively equal
bargaining power, arising in a functioning market where it is assumed there is a dollar
price for everything and, given their way, the parties will reach an efficient agreement. Speidel, The Borderland of Contract, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 163, 192 (1983).
15. Unequal bargaining situations often result in adhesion contracts. See infra
note 18 for a discussion of adhesion contracts.
16. For the past 25 years, courts have recognized that contract law is inadequate to protect the public against egregious conduct by insurance companies. See
generally Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If At All,
Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 425
(1981). There are many similarities between the banking and the insurance industries
justifying extension of the tort to banking. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying
text for a discussion of these similarities.
17. This view is supported by both the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) provides that writings intended as the final expression of the parties' agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior or
contemporaneous agreement. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 states:
"Where there is a binding agreement either completely or partially integrated, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations is not admissable in
evidence to contradict a term of the writing." Id.
18. One commentator has implied that the stronger party has duties beyond the
contract when it is one of adhesion, due to the duty of good faith and fair dealing. J.
MCCARTHY, PUNITIvE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 6.1, at 336-37 (2d ed. 1978).
McCarthy states:
Contracts of adhesion give no opportunity for bargaining between parties, but
enable one party to wield such power over the other as to require the ordinary
arms length principle of laissez faire to be reexamined . . . . Good faith and
fair dealing means one thing in ordinary contracts where profit is the motivation of both parties. It takes on another meaning in contracts of adhesion
Id. at 336-37.
19. An insecurity clause is a provision in a contract allowing a creditor to call
the entire debt due if there is a good reason to believe that a debtor cannot or will
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unilateral decisions concerning continued funding. As a condition of
the loan, many banks also insist that debtors maintain deposit accounts at the lenders' institutions.20 The banks, at their discretion,
can then offset the debtors' loan balances against the deposit accounts.2" If a bank does this without sufficient justification, the bank
will leave the debtor without adequate operating capital, forcing him
into bankruptcy.2 2 Consequently, courts that refuse to look beyond
the four corners of the contract will leave the debtor without a remedy. This serious injustice illustrates the need for courts to require
creditors to justify, with legitimate business reasons, their enforcement of harsh contract provisions.
Although a court may force creditors to justify their actions, the
court will not adequately compensate debtors if it adheres to traditional contract remedies.23 The usual remedies for unconscionable
contract provisions2 ' are rescission of the contract, severance of the
provision, or damages.2 These are unsatisfactory solutions when
creditors unreasonably injure their debtors.
Rescission of the contract will require the debtor to return the
loan proceeds to the bank. Because the borrower probably spent or
invested the cash, rescission will force the debtor to liquidate the
assets purchased with the funds. Thus, rescission is an inadequate
remedy leaving the borrower in the same position that he was in
when the bank unjustifiably called the loan.26
not pay. BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 715.
20. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985)
(financing agreement stipulated that debtor must deposit all receipts into account to
which bank would have sole access).
21. Offset, sometimes called the "banker's lien," allows the bank to withdraw
from the debtors' deposit account funds needed to cover a debt owed to the bank.
The bank requires no court order and need not inform the depositor that it has this
right or that it is making use of it. 1976 U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT MONEY MANAGEMENT 39 [hereinafter MONEY MANAGEMENT]. See, e.g., K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 754
(bank used company's deposit account to payoff loan without company's knowledge);
First Nat'l Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1228-29 (Mont. 1984) (bank
used debtors' checking account to payoff debtors' loan without debtors' knowledge).
22. See infra note 55 and accompanying text for an example of a bank's action
forcing debtor into bankruptcy.
23. For a discussion of the limitation of contract remedies, see infra notes 28-29
and accompanying text.
24. The basic test of unconscionability is whether, in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided that they are unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of making of the contract. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1978).
25. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1) (1978) states:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id.
26. One can contrast this situation to the retail sales agreement where rescission
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Severance of the offensive contractual provision is feasible only
if the bank has not enforced the provision.2 7 Where the bank offset
deposit accounts or refused to advance funds pursuant to the loan

agreement, the bank may have irreparably harmed the borrower's
business. If a business has lost contracts or has declared bankruptcy,
returning deposit accounts or forcing the bank to honor its loan
commitment will not adequately compensate the borrower for the
harm already inflicted.

In contract law, economic policies limit the award of money
damages.2 8 Recovery is allowed only for economic injuries that were
foreseeable consequences of the breach at the time the contract was
made. 29 In a debtor-creditor contract, this means that a creditor's
liability is limited to damages that were foreseeable when the loan
was made, rather than those that were foreseeable when the creditor
unjustifiably called the loan. Courts, therefore, will more likely measure damages according to the amount of the loan rather than the
actual fiscal impact that the creditor's conduct had on the debtor.
Creditors facing only limited damages for their unreasonable
conduct will continue to act unjustifiably whenever it is in their selfinterest. Consequently, courts seeking to adequately compensate
of the contract means that the debtor returns the merchandise in exchange for any
consideration paid to the retailer. Under these circumstances, rescission is an adequate remedy.
27. Where a debtor has notice that the bank is planning enforcement of a harsh
contract provision, he.may be able to get an injunction preventing the bank's enforcement. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Crown Plumbing and Sewer Serv., Inc., 523 S.W.2d 72
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (court issued injunction enjoining creditor from accelerating
loan and foreclosing on property). This equitable remedy is not always available, particularly where the bank has acted without notice. See infra note 54 and accompanying text for an example of a bank acting without notice.
28. Contract law has two underlying purposes: protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties and promoting an efficient, reliable economic system. Diamond,
supra note 16, at 437. Contract law is designed to promote a market economy by
affording parties maximum flexibility in the performance and termination of contracts. Speidel, supra note 14, at 166. Remedies in contract law promote the parties'
reasonable expectations by awarding the injured party the value of the breaching
party's promised performance-the benefit of the bargain. Id.
Damages are limited to economic losses foreseeable at the time the contract was
executed. Diamond, supra note 16, at 433-34. This limitation reduces uncertainty for
the contracting parties and encourages them to enter into commercial transactions.
Id. at 437. The limitation also encourages efficient resource allocation. Id. at 435.
A breaching party who knows in advance the cost of its breach can assess when
the gain from the breach exceeds compensating the aggrieved party. Speidel, supra
note 14, at 173. When the gain from the breach exceeds the value of performing the
contract, economic efficiency is achieved. Diamond, supra note 16, at 435. This theory, known as "efficient breach," downplays the wrongfulness of the breaching party's
conduct. Id. at 438. It emphasizes the economic reasons permitting reinvestment of
the net gain into other economic opportunities and assumes that the injured party
can recover full compensation from the breaching party in a relatively quick and
costless litigation. Id. at 441.
29. Diamond, supra note 16, at 433-34.
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debtors for injuries inflicted by unreasonable creditors should look
beyond contract law to fashion remedies discouraging unjustifiable
conduct. Two recent decisions"0 illustrate the contrast between strict
adherence to the written document and a more liberal approach,
where the court examines the creditor's justification for enforcing
offensive provisions. These cases demonstrate that courts considering the reasonableness of the creditor's conduct, in addition to the
written agreement, will arrive at more equitable results than courts
limiting their inquiries to the written document.
ANALYSIS OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS

In Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distributors,Inc.,3 ' the
debtors purchased a business after the company's bank assured
them that it would continue the company's line of credit.3 2 The
bank's loan officer told the debtors that the bank would continue
financing if they were willing to personally guarantee the loan."3 The
loan officer, however, failed to disclose that the bank considered the
loan a risk and was, in fact, preparing to demand full payment of all
35
funds previously disbursed.3 " Relying on the loan officer's promise,
the debtors purchased the business and gave the bank their personal
guarantees.3 " Three days after the debtors delivered their personal
guarantees, the bank proceeded with its plan and demanded full
payment on the loan. 7 The debtors, unable to find other financing,
surrendered the business' assets to the bank. 8 After liquidating the
business' assets, the bank sued to collect an additional $400,000 on
the debtors' guarantees.3 " The debtors countersued, contending that
40
the bank had made a fraudulent and material misrepresentation.
30. Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distribs., Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985) (demonstrating strict adherence to written document); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (demonstrating more liberal
interpretation).
31. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
32. A line of credit is "an agreement between a bank and a customer whereby

the bank agrees, over a future period, to lend the customer funds up to an agreed
maximum amount." Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Commonwealth Gen., Ltd., 386 So. 2d
31, 33 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). "The bank has the option to withdraw from the
agreement if the financial status of the borrower changes, or if the borrower fails to
use the line of credit for its intended use as per the agreement." Id.
33. Centerre Bank, 705 S.W.2d at 48-49.
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id. at 45.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 47.
38. Id. at 46.
39. Id.
40. A misrepresentation is material if it either induces a reasonable person to
act or the maker of the misrepresentation knows that it is likely to induce a reasonable person to act. A misrepresentation is fraudulent if it is intended to mislead another. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1979). In contract law, a mis-
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They also contended that the bank breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, which is implied in every contract.4 1 Following

a jury verdict for the debtors, the bank appealed. 2
The Missouri appellate court held that the written contract was
a completely integrated agreement.43 Therefore, the parol evidence
rule" prohibited the introduction of any evidence regarding the loan
officer's verbal representations. 45 The court then found that the
written agreement gave the bank the right to demand payment at
anytime. As a result, the bank's actions were justified. 6 In addition,
the court noted that the debtors' relationship with the bank was one
of borrower and lender and that the bank did not owe the debtors a
fiduciary obligation.' Consequently, the bank's failure to disclose its
intentions regarding the loan did not constitute fraud."' The court
stated that the bank's conduct was not unfair or morally offensive.' 9
The debtors, therefore, could not avoid liability on their personal
guarantees.
Conversely, in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,50 the company
had a $3.5 million line of credit with the bank that was secured with
assets." When the company requested a disbursement against the
credit line, the bank refused to advance the funds." At the same
representation which is either material or fraudulent may have three distinct effects:
it may prevent contract formation; it may make the contract voidable; or it may provide grounds for a decree of reformation. Id. § 159, at 424 (introductory note). Misrepresentation in a contract does not give rise to a claim for damages. Id. In tort law,
a misrepresentation that is both material and fraudulent may be the basis for a damage claim. Id.
41. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the convenant of good faith and fair dealing.
42. Centerre Bank, 705 S.W.2d at 44.
43. An integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of agreement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209
(1) (1979). A completely integrated agreement is an integrated agreement adopted by
the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Id. §
210 (1).
44. The parol evidence rule prohibits the introduction of any evidence contradicting integrated agreements. See supra note 17 for a discussion of the parole evidence rule.
45. Centerre Bank, 705 S.W.2d at 51.
46. Id. at 48.
47. Id. at 53. See supra note 11 for a discussion of fiduciary duties.
48. The Centerre court stated: "In order that supression of the truth may constitute fraud, there must be a suppression of facts which one party is under a legal or
equitable obligation to communicate to the other.and which the other party is entitled to have communicated." Centerre Bank, 705 S.W.2d at 53. The court found that
absent some fiduciary or confidential relationship, banks have no duty to disclose the
status of loans to prospective debtors. Id.
49. Id. at 54.
50. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
51. The bank held a security interest in the debtors' accounts receivable and
inventory. Id. at 754. An audit conducted by the bank concluded that in the event of
the company's liquidation, no loss would be sustained by the bank. Id. at 762.
52. Id. at 754.
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time, the bank used the company's deposit accounts to offset funds
previously advanced under the credit line.53 Because the bank did
not give the company notice prior to acting, 4 the company did not
have an opportunity to secure alternate financing. The bank's actions deprived the company of working capital and forced it to declare bankruptcy. The company subsequently filed suit against the
bank contending that the bank should have given advance notice
that it was about to terminate the credit line and that failure to do
so was a breach of good faith by the bank.56 Further, the company
alleged that the bank's misconduct directly caused the company's
business failure.' The bank maintained that the company was already on the verge of financial collapse. Therefore, the bank's conduct was not only reasonable but specifically permitted under the
loan document.5 8 Following a $7.5 million jury verdict for the company, the bank appealed."
On appeal, the bank raised several issues. First, the bank argued that the trial court erred in permitting a jury trial because the
company waived that right as a provision of the loan. 0 Second, the
bank argued that it did not, in fact, breach the financing agreement.6 ' Third, the bank argued that the amount awarded was excessive.12 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the jury
verdict.6 "
The court first held that the trial judge properly admitted parol
evidence regarding the intent of the parties with respect to the
waiver of a jury trial in the parties' agreement.6 ' Next, the court
addressed the breach of contract issue. The court recognized that
53. See id. at 759.
54. Although the bank's loan agreement stated that advances under the line
were payable on demand, the court implied that the bank had to give reasonable
notice. Id. Because the bank controlled all of the company's demand deposits, the
court stated that "literal interpretation of the financing agreement . . . would leave
K.M.C.'s continued existence entirely at the whim or mercy of Irving." Id.
55. The bank's unexpected action deprived the company of all its cash. Id. at
763. As a result, over $800,000 worth of checks written to suppliers were dishonored.
See id. at 762. The court stated that the bank's action resulted in "a unilateral decision on [its] part to wind up the company." Id. at 763.
56. Id. at 754.
57. Id.
58. The bank argued that the court should not imply any notice requirement
because such an implication would be inconsistent with the express provisions of the
contract. Id. at 759.
59. Id. at 754-55.
60. Id. at 755.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 766.
63. Id.
64. The court stated that a party may waive its right to a jury trial only if done
knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally. Therefore, more than " 'mere contract law
is involved' in determining whether waiver was effective under the applicable
standard." Id. at 755-56 (citations omitted).
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the written agreement entitled the bank to refuse further disbursements under the credit line. 5 The court stated, however, that the
bank abused its discretion because a reasonable bank, that was fully
secured, would have advanced the funds rather than cause irreparable harm to its borrower.6 6 The court stated that the bank acted
unreasonably, thereby breaching the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing that is implied in every contract.67 The bank was, therefore,
liable for the actual damage that it caused the company."8 The court
stated that the correct measure of damages was based in part on the
value that an acquiring firm would have been willing to pay for the
company prior to insolvency.0 0 The correct measure was not, as the
70
bank argued, the company's value as an ongoing business.
In both Centerre Bank71 and K.M.C.,

72

the courts had to ad-

dress the harsh results that occur when banks enforce draconian
contract provisions against their debtors. The courts reached strikingly different conclusions based upon the varying degree of importance that each accorded the written document. Consequently, these
courts sent conflicting messages to the banking industry regarding a
bank's obligation of good faith and fair dealing towards its debtors.
The Centerre Bank message emphasized that there is no fiduciary obligation in a debtor-creditor relationship.7 3 The implication is
that banks can limit their duty to deal fairly and in good faith by
the written contract.7 4 The court's rigid adherence to the loan agree65. Id. at 759.
66. Id. at 761.
67. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the implied
convenant of good faith and fair dealing.
68. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d at 752, 766 (6th Cir. 1985).
69. Id. at 764. The Court stated that damages amounted to the difference in
value of K.M.C. before and after insolvency. Id. The amount a willing buyer would
pay and the amount a willing seller would accept would determine those values. Id.
70. The company had at least one prospective buyer prior to its insolvency. Id.
at 762. This buyer had made its interest in the company known to the bank the day
before the bank refused its advances. Id.
71. Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distribs., Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985).
72. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d 752.
73. Centerre Bank, 705 S.W.2d at 53.
74. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978) states: "Every contract or duty within this act imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." The court stated that
this provision was not applicable to demand loans because:
[E]xecution of a demand note constitutes an agreement between the borrower
and the lender that the note may be called for payment at any time. . . . The
imposition of a good faith defense to the call for payment of a demand note
transcends the performance or enforcement of a contract and in fact adds a
term to the agreement which the parties had not included. The additional term
would be that the note is not payable at any time demand is made but only
payable when demand is made if such demand is made in good faith. The parties by the demand note did not agree that payment would be made only when
demand was made in good faith but agreed that payment would be made
whenever demand was made.
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ment allowed the bank to purposefully mislead unsuspecting debtors. Centerre Bank knew that the debtors would not purchase the
business without the bank's assurance of continued financing.75 Despite this knowledge, the court stated that the bank had no duty to
disclose its intention to demand payment on the credit line.7 ' The
court's refusal to consider parole evidence implies that as long as
banks do not reduce their promises to writing, they can mislead potential debtors or guarantors by making verbal promises that they
have no intention of keeping. Ethical considerations should preclude
banks from deliberately misleading prospective guarantors merely to
find a "deep pocket" to assume the risk of a potentially bad loan.
Unless courts discourage such practices, however, banks will engage
in such conduct whenever it is in their economic self-interest to do
so.
In contrast, the K.M.C. 7 7 court sent a message to banks that
contractual rights and privileges will not protect a lender who engages in unreasonable conduct from liability to its debtors. The
court clearly stated that a bank's obligation of good faith did not
end merely because the agreement allowed the enforcement of harsh
contract provisions "at the bank's discretion. '7' The court refused to
rigidly adhere to the rules of contract law. Instead, it considered the
circumstances surrounding the enforcement of the provision and
thereby reached an equitable result.7 9 The K.M.C. court's decision
shows judicial recognition that overreaching is a potentially serious
problem which courts must not condone. 80 Several courts" have
reached similar conclusions when dealing with issues of insurance
industry overreaching. These courts have found that an insurance
82
company commits a tort when it breaches a contract in bad faith.
BREACH OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AS A TORT

A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every
contract.8 3 This covenant requires that neither party do anything
Centerre Bank, 705 S.W.2d at 47-48.
75. Id. at 49.
76. Id. at 53.
77. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d 752.
78. Id. at 760-61.
79. Id. at 759-61.
80. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of banks' impact on society.
81. See Louderback & Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith
Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 187, 196-202 (1982) (discussing courts that have
applied tort to insurance industry).
82. Id.
83. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1979). See generally Farnsworth, Good FaithPerformance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 666 (1963).

19881

Lenders' Liability

that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement. 4 When this duty is breached, a cause of action arises.85
As a general rule, breach of this covenant results in a breach of contract.8 " In recent years, however, several jurisdictions have recognized a cause of action in tort for breach of good faith and fair dealing.8 7 This provides the injured party with remedial relief that is not
available in an action founded in contract, including damages for
mental suffering,88 for economic losses not foreseeable at the time of
contracting, " and for punitive damages.90 To date, courts have limited this tort almost exclusively to the insurance industry.9 1
While many courts have recognized that there is a "special relationship" between an insurance company and its insured,92 few have
recognized that this same relationship exists between the banking
industry and its customers.9 This relationship, characterized by elements of adhesion, fiduciary responsibility and public interest, justifies imposition of the duty to act in good faith as a matter of law.
There are many similarities between the banking and the insurance
industries. In both industries, the relationship of the institution
with its customers is primarily unbalanced: both banks and insurance companies enjoy superior bargaining positions allowing them to
84. Diamond, supra note 16, at 425.
85. Louderbach & Jurika, supra note 81, at 187.
86. Id.
87. See S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 2.05, at 9, 10
n.1 (citing cases).
88. Diamond, supra note 16, at 426. "Recovery for emotional disturbance will
be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the breach is of such a kind
that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1979).
Professor Corbin explains that breaches of contract, in general, do not cause as
much resentment or other mental anguish as do wrongs labeled "torts." See 5 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1076 (1964).
89. Diamond, supra note 16, at 427.
90. Id.
91. See Kornblum, Recent Cases Interpreting the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and FairDealing, 30 DEF. L.J. 411, 431 n.50 (1981) (listing 17 states that have

adopted a tort cause of action in the insurance context).
92. The tort of bad faith breach of contract originally arose from the insurers'
refusal to settle within policy limits. Louderback & Jurika, supra note 81, at 199. The
tort has developed so that many other acts now give rise to liability. Id. For example,
an insurer may breach the covenant if it fails to properly investigate the insured's
claim, construes an ambiguity in its policy to the severe detriment of its insured or
cancels a policy for unjustifiable reasons. Id.
93. Three courts have recognized that breach of the implied covenant by a financial institution may give rise to a tort cause of action. See Skeels v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964) (assurance by company's manager
that credit union would extend loan made; otherwise proper action of foreclosure tortious); First Nat'l Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (recognizing bank's breach of covenant may be tortious and subject to punitive damages); McKay v. Farmers' and Stockmens' Bank of Clayton, 92 N.M. 181, 585 P.2d 325 (1978)
(refusing to recognize that bank had right as matter of law to accelerate debtors'
loan).
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dictate the terms of their agreements.94 In both industries, the
weaker party reasonably and justifiably places its trust and confidence in the larger entity. 5 Finally, both industries provide services
that are essential to the functioning of society." Therefore, legitimate public policy concerns justify extending the breach of good
faith tort from the insurance industry to the banking industry.
The legitimacy of this extension was recognized by the Montana
Supreme Court in First National Bank in Libby v. Twombly.97 The
Twombly court addressed the issue of whether the breach of good
faith tort should be applied to the banking industry." In Twombly,
the bank accelerated the debtors' loan and exercised an offset
against the debtors' checking account." The bank did not notify the
debtors of the offset.1"' Consequently, the debtors continued to
write checks on the account until several of the checks were returned for insufficient funds.1'0 The loan officer who had initiated
the action 10 2 refused to discuss the matter with the debtors.' 03 The
94. Contracts in both industries are adhesional. While the customer may be
able to find a variance in premium cost or interest notes, most other terms are usually
not subject to negotiation. See Purdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702
P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1985) (discussing adhesion contracts in banking industry). Schmidt v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins., 268 Cal. App. 2d 735, 74 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1969)
(discussing adhesion contracts in insurance industry); see also MONEY MANAGEMENT,
supra note 21, at 95-117 (discussing which terms in loan agreement parties may
negotiate).
95. An insurance transaction does not involve parties dealing at arms-length
with one another. Louderbach & Jurika, supra note 81, at 220. The contract is personal in nature and involves parties in a quasi-fiduciary relationship. Id. "There is a
special relationship between banks and their customers that is based on confidence
and trust in the bank itself. . . . If a bank does not maintain the highest standards
of integrity in its dealings that confidence and trust will be eroded." Symons, The
Bank-Customer Relation: Part 11-The JudicialDecisions, 100 BANKING L.J. 325, 329
(1983) (quoting Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 103 (1976) (statement of Richard A. Debs, First Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York)).
96. "In summary, the individual consumer in a highly organized and integrated
society must necessarily rely upon institutions devoted to the public service to perform the basic functions which they undertake." Gray v. Zurich Ins., 65 Cal. 2d 263,
280, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1977) (discussing importance of insurance companies to society). Another court discussed the role of banks in society:
Banks are necessary concomitants of civilization. To them are intrusted the
earnings of honest toil, the accumulations of intelligent enterprise; the trust
funds of charity, orphanage, and helpless old age; and, as managers of such
institutions, bank presidents, cashiers and directors cannot be too strongly impressed with the responsibility of their official positions.
State v. Commercial & Savings Bank of Kearey, 37 Neb. 174, 55 N.W. 640 (1893).
97. 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
98. Id. at 1230.
99. Id. at 1228.
100. Id. at 1229.
101. Id.
102. The debtors' loan became due while their normal loan officer was on vacation. Id. at 1228. Although the debtors had re-negotiated the loan, the loan officer in
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debtors sued the bank for breach of its duty of good faith. 10' The
trial court granted the bank's motion to exclude evidence of punitive
damages because contract actions generally exclude such damages.10 5
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court stated that the
duty to exercise good faith is imposed by law and breach of that
duty is a tort. 06 The court stated that "given a bank's relationship
to its debtor, punitive damages could be justified as an exemplary
imposition for oppression.' 10 7 Thus, the court implied that a "spe-

cial relationship" between a bank and its debtor exists which prohibits the bank from acting in reckless disregard of the debtor's
rights.'0 8 The court stated that such enforcement equals an abuse of
power' 0 9 that courts can discourage by awarding punitive damages." 0 Other courts, which have recognized this principle,"' have
applied traditional tort doctrines to debtor-creditor contracts.
THE USE OF OTHER TORTS IN DEBTOR CREDITOR RELATIONS

Although Twombly is the only court to clearly hold that a
breach of good faith is a tort in the banking industry," 2 several
courts have held that the unjustified enforcement of detrimental
contract provisions creates a separate and distinct tort."

For exam-

ple, in Van Bibber v. Norris,"" a bank repossessed a borrower's mobile home." 5 Although the borrower's payment was overdue, the
bank often accepted late payments from the debtor."' Because it
charge was not informed. Id. He did not believe the debtors when they informed him
of the re-negotiation and took action without further investigation. Id.

103. Id.
104.

Id. at 1227.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 1230.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109.

Id.

110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Van Biever v. Morris, 404 N.E.2d 1365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding bank liable for conversion); State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d
661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding bank liable for fraud, economic duress, and business interference).
112. First Nat'l Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 686 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984).
113. Torts such as fraud, negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress may stem from breach of contract. Diamond, supra note 16, at 431 n.23. Their
commission does not depend on any fiduciary relationship. Id. Several jurisdictions,
unwilling to impose tort liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith,
have held that any contracting party may be liable for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress if the breach is sufficiently willful and odious. Id.
114. 404 N.E.2d 1365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
115. Id. at 1371.
116. If a bank has consistently acquiesced in a customer's failure to abide by
the terms of the loan agreement, the bank has established a "course of dealing." This
requires that the bank give the customer reasonable notice before enforcing any insecurity clauses in the contract. Id. at 1373.
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appeared that the bank repossessed the home for reasons unrelated

to the delinquency, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the bank
did not act in good faith, and, therefore, committed a tort of conver-

sion. 117 The debtor was awarded punitive damages in addition to recovering the value of his home and furnishings.

'

The Texas Court of Appeals expanded this concept of tort liability to deter banks from unreasonably enforcing detrimental contract provisions" 9 in State National Bank v. FarahMfg. Co. 120 The
Farahcourt found the lenders liable for fraud, 2 ' economic duress, 2 '
and business interference 2 3 because they failed to exercise good
faith in dealing with the debtor company. 24 The case was based on

a management change provision 2

contained in a $22 million loan

agreement. 2 When the company attempted to make a change in its
executive management, the participating banks 27 threatened to
treat the change as a default that would trigger the acceleration of
the loan.' 28 The company's board of directors, fearing that the banks
would force the company into bankruptcy, proceeded to elect less
qualified officers who were chosen by the lenders.'29 Under this management, the company's position in the market place deteriorated.' 0

The banks then insisted that the company sell some of its assets to
117. The intentional tort of conversion is any unauthorized act of dominion or
ownership exercised by one person over personal property belonging to another, in
denial of or inconsistent with his right. Id. at 1380.
118. Id. at 1385.
119. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(bank did not actually enforce provision, but court found bank's threat to do so was
tortious).
120. Id.
121. The basic element of actionable fraud is material misrepresentation which,
when made, the speaker knows is false and which results in damage to another. Id. at
682.
122. "Economic duress. . . may be evidenced by forcing a victim to choose between distasteful and costly situations, i.e., bow to duress or face bankruptcy." Economic duress may be claimed only when the party against whom it is claimed was
responsible for the claimant's financial distress. Id. at 686-87.
123. The tort of interference with business relations embraces within its
scope all intentional invasions of contractual relations, including any act injuring or destroying property and thus interfering with performance of the contract itself, regardless of whether breach of contract is induced. It presupposes
knowledge of the plaintiff's interests or, at least, of facts that would lead a
reasonable man to believe in their existence.
Id. at 689.
124. Id. at 685.
125. The clause gave any two banks veto power over any change in the company's management if the banks considered the change "for any reason whatsoever,
to be adverse to the interests of the bank." Id. at 667. The banks could treat any
change occurring, despite the company's objections, as default. Id.
126. Id. at 666.
127. Five banks participated in making the loan. Id. at 667.
128. Id. at 668.
129. Id. at 676-77.
130. Id. at 679-80.
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reduce its loan obligations."3 ' The directors subsequently elected
management that was unacceptable to the banks and3 sued."3 2 After
a jury verdict for the company, the banks appealed.1
The appellate court held that the banks acted fraudulently because despite numerous threats made to the company, the banks
had not decided to declare the loan in default. 34 The court upheld a
duress claim based on the banks' threats that they would "bankrupt
[the company] and padlock it the next day."'3 6 The court noted that
banks cannot use acceleration clauses offensively to the commercial
advantage of the creditor. 3 6 Such provisions do not permit banks to
accelerate loans when the facts make such acceleration unjust or oppressive.1 7 The court stated that the banks went too far in controlling the company's management and affirmed a jury award of $18.6
million.' The court did not specifically address the applicability of
the breach of good faith tort to banking. It is evident from the
court's opinion, however, that the court was concerned about the impact that the banking industry has on the general public. 39
TORT RECOVERY SHOULD BE ALLOWED AGAINST BANKS

Banks are one of the mainstays of American industrial society.14 0 Customers believe that bankers will give advice in good
faith."M Furthermore, customers expect that their relationship with
a bank, in contrast to other commercial transactors, will involve a
higher degree of confidence and a greater reliance on the bank's
judgment. " "
A debtor-creditor relationship usually is not fiduciary in nature,"3 and in such relationships, banks have no duty to favor their
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
harm its
140.

Id. at 678.
Id. at 678-79.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 685.
Id.
Id. at 691-99.
Among the concerns that the court expressed were the bank's power to
debtors, and the social utility of the bank's actions. Id. at 684, 690.
See generally P. TRESCOIT, FINANCING AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: THE STORY

(1963).
141. "Advice and money are the two commodities banks have to sell. We don't
need their money, but we do need, and do get excellent advisory service from them."
OF COMMERCIAL BANKING

G.

53 (1957).
142. Banks encourage this view with their advertising. Symons, supra note 12,
at 327-28.
143. A fiduciary relationship may arise when a debtor places faith, confidence
and trust in the judgment or advice of the bank. See, e.g., Williams v. Griffin, 35
Mich. App. 179, 192 N.W.2d 283, 285 (1971) (fiduciary relationship exists when there
is reposing of faith, confidence and trust, and the placing of reliance by one upon
KATONA, BUSINESS LOOKS AT BANKS
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customers' well-being. The banking industry, however, interacts
with the vast majority of the public, "4 supplies vital services14 and
enjoys a superior bargaining position." 6 Courts, therefore, must hold
banks to a standard of fairness and reasonableness.
In contract law, the parties' agreement defines their duties. " "
Consequently, by their agreement, parties can limit the scope and
content of their duties. Accordingly, courts rarely use public policy
considerations to interfere with obligations and duties that the parties negotiated. " In adhesion contracts, however, the larger entity
dictates the terms of the agreement.4 9 There is no bargaining. If the
larger entity is also part of an industry interacting with the general
public, courts should assure that the entity conducts its business
dealings fairly and reasonably. This inquiry is necessary to protect
the general public, as well as the weaker party to the contract.5 0
Tort law protects members of society from the unreasonable actions of others by requiring certain minimal standards of conduct.' 5'
Public policy plays a major role in determining what particular acts
constitute a tort." 2 Tort law also recognizes that lawful acts can be
tortious if done for a wrongful purpose.' Furthermore, when necessary to serve the public interest, tort law punishes egregious conduct
to deter others from performing similar acts in the future. 54 Where
a creditor's egregious conduct injures its debtor, courts should strive
judgment and advice of the other). See infra note 158 for an example of a fiduciary
relationship in debtor-creditor contract.
144. "It is almost inconceivable that any man should engage in financial transactions of any magnitude in the modern time without having recourse to some bank
not only as a place of safety to keep his money, but as a place to secure loans to
conduct his business." See Symons, supra note 95, at 327 (quoting Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937)).
145. The modern commercial bank is a multiservice organization. It obtains
funds by offering checking, savings and time deposit accounts. SIMPSON, MONEY,
BANKING AND ECONOMIc ANALYSIS 52 (2d ed. 1981). It then uses these funds to make
loans to businesses, farmers and households. Id. To these regular banking functions,
one must add such diverse functions as servicing credit cards, trust operations, safe
deposit box rental, equipment leasing and dealership in government securities and
foreign exchange. Id.
146. See supra note 94 and accompanying text for a discussion of a bank's bargaining position.
147. Louderbach & Jurika, supra note 81, at 191.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 220.
150. Id. at 220-22.
151. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971).
152. Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 34, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (1980).
153. This concept, known as the prima facie tort, is defined as "infliction of
intentional harm, resulting in damages, without excuse or justification, by an act or
series of acts which would otherwise be lawful." See generally Note, The Prima Facie
Tort Doctrine: Acknowledging the Need for Judicial Scrutiny of Malice, 63 B.U.L.
REV. 1101 (1981) (quoting A.T.I., Inc. v. Ruder & Finn, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 368
N.E.2d 1230, 1232, 398 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (1977)).
154. Diamond, supra note 16, at 427 n.7.
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to compensate the debtor and to discourage the creditor from performing such acts in the future. Therefore, tort law, which is intended to achieve desirable social conduct, is preferred over contract
law, to enjoin unjustifiable creditor conduct.
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF TORT LAW IN DEBTORCREDITOR CONTRACTS

Although tort remedies are more favorable to debtors than contract remedies, courts should apply them only in limited circumstances. When banks legitimately fear default 50 or impairment of
security,156 courts should allow them to invoke the protection of
their contracts. However, if banks enforce harsh contract provisions
for reasons other than protection of their property interests, courts
should impose tort remedies.
When dealing with debtor-creditor documents, courts should
not limit their inquiry to the four corners of the document. Courts
must consider the totality of circumstances. Some of the basic factors courts must consider include the following: the history of the
banking relationship; verbal agreements outside the written contract; the motive of the bank in claiming default; and public policy.
The History of the Banking Relationship
The customer's prior associations and dealings with the bank
are important considerations in determining whether there was an
arms-length transaction. 5 " Courts should examine the length of the
banking relationship and investigate whether the customer has previously sought and relied upon the bank's financial advice. The
court should also determine whether the bank knew or should have
known of the customer's reliance on its advice. Where the customer
has had a long association with the bank and has previously acted
upon its financial advice, a fiduciary relationship may have developed." 8 In such cases, courts should preclude the bank from taking
155. Sheppard Fed. Credit Union v. Palmer, 408 F.2d 1369, 1371 (5th Cir.
1969); see also U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978) (providing that party may accelerate payment
only if believes in good faith that the prospect of payment is impaired).
156. Sheppard, 408 F.2d at 1371.
157. See Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937).
158. In Stewart, the debtor was a customer of the bank for 23 years. Id. at 104.
During that time, the debtor often sought and relied on the bank's financial advice.
Id. The debtor gave the bank a mortgage on real estate to secure a loan. Id. When the
loan was due, the debtor informed the bank that he would not be able to pay on time.
Id. The bank assured the debtor that it would not foreclose. Id. Nevertheless, the
bank did foreclose. Id. at 105. At that time, the bank promised the debtor that if he
could secure funds to repay the bank, it would reconvey the property. Id. When the
debtor acquired the necessary funds, the bank refused to reconvey the property. Id.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the bank had a fiduciary relation-
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harsh measures against the debtor unless it has attempted to reach a
mutually satisfactory agreement regarding the dispute. " "
Verbal Agreements Outside the Written Contract
The parties' conduct during the formation of the loan should be
examined. The court should determine whether the loan was actually an arms-length transaction or whether the bank had a motive
for encouraging or inducing the debtor to make the loan." s° The
court should also consider whether the bank made any statements
which justified the debtor's belief that the bank would not enforce

certain provisions in the written contract.'

It is also necessary to

determine whether both parties fully disclosed all pertinent information regarding the purpose and terms of the loan.
The Motive of the Bank in Claiming Default
Whether the bank claimed default for reasons other than protecting its property interest is relevant to determining whether the
bank acted in good faith."" Fair dealing should preclude attempts to
coerce a debtor for reasons unrelated to protecting the bank's rights
and expectations. The court should also examine whether the bank
acquiesed in the borrower's breach of contract without objection.""
ship to the debtor. Id. at 106. It stated that although there is ordinarily no fiduciary
duty in a debtor-creditor relationship, the bank had acted as the debtor's financial
advisor for many years. Id. The bank, having assumed that role, was subject to the
duties imposed on one in that position. The bank, therefore, had a duty to act with
the debtor's best interest in mind. Id. at 105.
159. See, e.g., McKay v. Farmers & Stockmen's Bank of Clayton, 92 N.M. 101,
585 P.2d 325, 327 (1978) (court found that bank's refusal to assist debtors seeking
alternative financing raised questions about the reasonableness of the bank's
conduct).
160. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Rochester, 238 N.W.2d
218 (Minn. 1976). In Stenberg, the bank convinced the debtors to convert their unsecured loan to a loan guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (S.B.A.). Id.
The debtors alleged that the bank knew that the debtors would have difficulty making the payments on the new loan because the term was reduced from twelve years to
six years. Id. at 219. The court ruled, however, even if there was a fiduciary relationship between the bank and the debtors, the bank would never intentionally imperil
its own funds through a bad loan. Id.
161. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985)
(bank told debtors that it would not enforce jury waiver unless the debtors had committed fraud).
162. See, e.g., Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979). In
Brown, the debtors financed an airplane through the creditor. Id. at 1369. The contract stated that the plane could not be leased without the creditor's approval. Id.
The debtors leased the airplane and informed the creditors of their actions, but the
creditors never formally approved the lease. Id. Two years later, the debtors offered
what they believed was full payment of the debt. Id. The creditors refused the offer,
accelerated the loan and repossessed the airplane, which was sold for almost twice the
payoff value of the loan. Id.
163. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont.
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If so, courts should require the bank to continue its financing unless
it gave the debtor adequate notice that noncompliance with the
terms of the agreement would no longer be tolerated. ' "
Public Policy
The court should consider whether it should discourage the
bank's conduct because it was overreaching, capricious or improperly motivated. To aid in this determination, the court should examine whether the bank acted in its own self-interest by misrepresenting facts during the formation of the loan.16 5 The court should
also seek to determine whether the bank acted recklessly by creating
a high degree of risk to the debtor's interest when there was little
danger of impairment to the bank's interest. ' The court should not
look at the contract in isolation. Instead, it should consider the consequences to the public if the bank continues engaging in the conduct that the debtor complained of.
Courts should attempt to balance the respective rights and interests of the parties. They should consider the extent of harm to
the debtor if the creditor claims default and enforces harsh contract
provisions. They should also consider the extent of harm to the
creditor if the debtor is allowed to continue performance contrary to
the written contract. If, after considering all the relevant facts, the
court concludes that the bank enforced offensive contract provisions
without serious threat to its property interest, the court should compensate the debtor for all injuries caused by the creditor's unreasonable conduct. Where contract remedies do not adequately compensate the debtor, the court should award tort damages. Where the
bank's conduct was outrageous, courts should allow tort recovery to
discourage similar behavior in the future.
CONCLUSION

The banking industry affects almost every member of our society. Its customers range from elderly widows to large, publicly
traded corporations. As a matter of public policy, therefore, courts
should not treat banks' acts of unfairness or bad faith as mere
breaches of contract. Courts also should not condone bad faith by
allowing banks to enforce draconian contract provisions without le1984) (bank often accepted late payments, thereby establishing course of dealing).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distribs., Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (bank told potential buyers it would continue financing business

though it had no intention of doing so).
166. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985)
(bank refused to advance money on line of credit although bank was fully secured).
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gitimate business reasons. In order to protect the public from egregious conduct by members of the banking industry, courts must
adopt tort remedies. Only by doing so will courts assure that the
banking industry deals fairly and reasonably with its customers.
Donna B. Wallace

